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COMMENTS
EXPANDING ANTIFRAUD PROTECTION: THE
PLEDGE OF STOCK UNDER SECTIONS
17(a) & 10(b) OF THE
SECURITIES ACTS
INTRODUCTION

It is an acceptable, if not absolutely necessary, commercial
banking practice to require a borrower to put up collateral as
security for a loan.1 To meet this requirement, a borrower will
commonly place corporate "securities" 2 with the lending institution in order to satisfy the collateral obligation. 3 This transaction is referred to as a pledge of stock.
A pledge of stock, or other property, transfers possession of
the property to the "secured" pledgee. Legal title to the property remains with the pledgor, yet an inchoate property interest
1. From a lender's standpoint, an ideal risk situation would be to have
all loans fully collateralized. Yet, obtaining an optimum return on its loans
is often in conflict with this "ideal situation"; a bank will sometimes make
unsecured loans to its "best customers" at higher interest rates. Thus, a
bank must continuously reexamine the amount of secured and unsecured
debt in its portfolio in order to achieve an optimum return while minimizing
risk.
2. The term "security" is defined as:
Any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, pre-organization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest
in oil, gas or other mineral right, or, in general, any interest ...or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee
of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1) (1976). This definition has been
adopted verbatim in the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a2(a) (36) (1976), and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b2(a) (18) (1976). The definition of "security" in the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1976) is regarded as virtually the same as
that in the 1933 Act. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 342
(1967). For a side-by-side comparison of the two securities acts' definitions
of "security," see Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality
and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219, 221-22 n.13

(1974) [hereinafter cited as Hannan &Thomas]. The Supreme Court has
specifically rejected technical distinctions between the Acts. See S.E.C. v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
3. See 1B A. BENDERS, U.C.C. SERV. § 14.01111 at 1502 (1978); see also
Hueter, The Plight of the Pledgee Under Rule 144, 91 BANKING L.J. 511 (1974).
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inures to the pledgee. When the loan obligation is satisfied, the
pledgee relinquishes his security interest to the pledgor. 4 In the
event of default, however, the inchoate security interest matures
and the pledgee can foreclose on the collateral in satisfaction of
the pledgor's debt obligation. 5 The only restriction on the foreclosing pledgee6 in liquidating the collateral is commercial
reasonableness.
The rights of parties in a sale of stock are distinct from the
rights of parties in a pledge situation.7 An ordinary seller of
stock releases all rights in the stock upon consummation of the
sale. A pledgor of stock, on the other hand, retains the right to
sell the stock subject to the security interest, the right to vote
the stock, and the right to receive dividends. The pledgor is also
liable for any taxes applicable to the stock. 8 A pledgor, then,
does not release any of these incidental rights of ownership pursuant to the pledge transaction. It is only when the pledgee
moves to foreclose on the pledged stock that the rights of the
pledgor are terminated and, even then, the pledgee must ac4. See generally L.
ACTIONS

LARKIN

6 (1970).

& H.

BERGER,

A GUIDE

TO SECURED TRANS-

Pledges and other secured transactions are governed by U.C.C. article
9. Under that article, the pledgee must use reasonable care in the custody
and preservation of collateral in his possession. Further, a pledgee is liable
for any loss resulting from his lack of care, but in any event the pledgor
does not forfeit his security interest. U.C.C. § 9-207 (1978). It is generally
recognized that the pledgee is a fiduciary of the pledgor. See RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW OF SECUarrY,

§§ 17, 22 (1941) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT

OF SECURITY].

5. See U.C.C. §§ 9-502-9-504 (1978). In addition to foreclosure under
the U.C.C., the secured party can usually avail himself of specific state laws
governing creditor's rights. The pledgee may also choose to sue as an unsecured creditor in hopes of obtaining a judgment lien against the pledgor.
Default can occur not only with nonpayment, but also when the pledgor,
pursuant to a security agreement, refuses to provide additional collateral.
See U.C.C. § 1-208 (1978).
6. U.C.C. § 9-504 (1978). See also U.C.C. § 9-507 (2) (applicable tests as
to what is "commercially reasonable").
7. In addition to the parties' rights, the motivations of the parties in a
sale or pledge are also distinguishable. A seller is motivated by the direct
receipt of consideration, whereas a pledgee's primary motive in accepting
stock as collateral for a loan is to indirectly compel repayment by the threat
of foreclosure. A pledgee-lender does not ordinarily intend to invest in the
securities directly as a buyer would. See Comment, The Pledge and the
Purchase and Sale Requirement of Section 10(b) and Rule 10-b5, 65 GEO.
L.J. 1593, 1607 n.86 (1977).
The pledgee does, however, have a continuing concern that the rate of
return and market value will be adequate in the event of default. It is this
contingent and continuing concern that distinguishes pledges from bailments of securities. Id.
8. See L. JONES, COLLATERAL SECURITY AND PLEDGES, §§ 1, 176A, 441,
602 (3d ed. 1912).
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count to the pledgor for excess proceeds received in a foreclosure sale.9
When fraud occurs in connection with a pledge of stock, it is
usually the pledgee that is victimized and must seek relief. 10
For example, a typical fraudulent pledge arises when the pledgor intentionally overstates the value of pledged securities in
hopes of obtaining a larger and, in effect, uncollateralized loan.
Upon discovery of the misrepresentation, the defrauded pledgee
can seek a remedy in the state courts for common law fraud or
corporate mismanagement. The aggrieved pledgee can also sue
in a private action under the antifraud provisions" of the federal
9. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY, supra note 4, at § 27.
10. It is difficult to envision a situation where a fraud is perpetrated
against a pledgor. Suppose a pledgee deceives the pledgor into pledging
understated securities. In order to capitalize on its fraud, the pledgee must
foreclose and sell the securities. Any windfall in the foreclosure sale, i.e.,
proceeds in excess of pledgor's debt, must be returned to the pledgor. See
supra note 9 and accompanying text; cf. McClure v. First National Bank, 497
F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974) (pledgee did not have to foreclose on pledged stock
in order to capitalize on its fraud since land underlying asset value of pledg-

ed stock was seized instead. A quite different problem arises when a defaulting pledgor, whose stock is being foreclosed upon, alleges fraud in the
foreclosure process. See, e.g., Dopp v. Franklin National Bank, 374 F. Supp.
904 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (standing to challenge an alleged fraud granted to pledgor when foreclosure sale price of stock was intentionally understated by
pledgee and could not satisfy pledgor's debt).
11. For purposes of this discussion "antifraud provisions" shall refer to:
§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976) [hereinafter
referred to as Section 17(a)]; § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Section 10(b) 1; and Securities &Exchange Commission [hereinafter referred to as SEC] Rule lOb5, promulgated under Section 10(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981) [hereinafter
referred to as Rule 10b-5].
Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or
indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of
a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in a transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and
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securities acts.
The prevailing view among legal scholars is that it is more
advantageous for a defrauded pledgee to sue under the federal
acts than under state law. Among the procedural advantages13
are the availability of nationwide venue and service of process,
a relaxed privity requirement enabling a broader class of defendants' 4 and liberal rules concerning discovery,' 5 pleading
and joinder. 16 Furthermore, the common law elements of fraud
have either been eliminated or modified, making it easier to establish a claim of actionable fraud under the federal securities
acts as opposed to state laws. 17 Implicit in the suggestion that a
defrauded pledgee will benefit more by suing under the federal
acts is that defrauded pledgees have standing to sue under the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities acts.
Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1976) (emphasis added).
Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981) (emphasis added). Rule lOb-5 was adopted by
the SEC in 1942 to effectuate the provisions of Section 10(b). See SEC ExCHANGE ACT RELEASE No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). For a comparison of other
major antifraud provisions, see 1 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRITIEs LAW FRAUD
§§ 4.6, 8.2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG] (table listing features of
each provision).
12. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a--77aa (1976) [hereinafter
referred to as 1933 Act], and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a--78kk (1976) [hereinafter referred to as 1934 Act, and collectively with
the 1933 Act as "securities acts" or "the Acts"]. Although a private right of
action has been recognized by the courts under both Acts, the availability of
such a right under section 17(a) has been criticized in recent years. See
Horton, Section 17(a) of the 1933 SecuritiesAct-the Wrong Placefor a Private Right, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 44 (1973).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
14. See BROMBERG, supra note 11, at § 2.5(3).
15. See CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 794 (4th ed.
1969).
16. See Comment, Commercial Notes and Definitions of Security Under
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note? 52 NEB. L. REV.

478, 509 (1973).

17. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) (discussion of

elements). See also A.

JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF

RULE 10b-5 §§ 60, 60.1 (1979).
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This comment will focus on the question of whether a
pledge of stock is a sale and, thus, a protected transaction for
purposes of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act 18 and, by extension, of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 19 A preliminary examination of
the history and purpose of the securities acts is followed by a
review of the case law on this issue up to and including the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Rubin v. United
States.20 Finally, a parallel application of Rubin's section 17(a)
holding is considered and applied to section 10(b).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE SECURrrIES ACTS

Origin and Intent
Prior to 1933, securities regulation was the exclusive province of state "blue sky laws."'2 1 The first state "blue sky" act was
passed in Kansas in 1911. The concept of state securities regulation became so popular that, within two years, twenty-three
states adopted securities legislation. By the beginning of the
Great Depression of 1929, virtually all22state jurisdictions had
some variation of securities legislation.
Securities legislation among the states, however, lacked national uniformity. Consequently, a movement to create a federal
agency to regulate trading of securities in interstate commerce
began in the mid-1920s. This trend became a critical national
concern in the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929.23
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Rule lOb-5 is presumed, for discussion purposes, to apply to discussions of Section 10(b).
20. 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
21. One author maintains that the label "blue sky laws" evolved from
the unscrupulous practices of early securities salesmen which were likened

to sellers "of building lots in the blue sky." L Loss & E. CoWETr, BLUE SKY

LAws, 7 n.22 (1958). Another proposed origin is Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242
U.S. 539 (1917) where it was said that early state securities acts were passed
to control "speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many
feet of 'blue sky."' Id. at 550. At any rate, the distinction is somewhat
nebulous.
22. See Long, State Securities Regulation-An Overview, 32 OKLA. L.
REV. 541, 542 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Long].
23. 1 L. Loss, SEcuarrs REGULATION 119-21

(2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Loss]. The stock market crash was really the "volcanic eruption"
of a multitude of irregular and fraudulent investment schemes. Typically in
the post-World War I period, a scheme would be contrived and state regulation would follow ex postfacto. To illustrate, in 1918, the Attorney General
of Illinois was asked to decide whether a contract for the purchase and
maintenance of brood sows was a "security." He concluded that under the
applicable Illinois statute, such a scheme would not be a "security." The
next year, the Illinois legislature revised the definition of "security" so that
such an investment contract or profit-sharing agreement would be encompassed in the statute. This type of response-oriented legislation triggered a
domino effect in the investment field so that ingenious, but often fraudu-
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The movement for federal intervention in the securities market
culminated in the passage of the Securities Act of 193324 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.25
Congress enacted the 1933 Act with the express purpose of
providing "full and fair disclosure of the character of securities
...and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof. ' 26 The 1934 Act
provides for "regulation of securities exchanges and of over-thecounter markets" and prevents "inequitable and unfair prac'2 7
tices on such exchanges and markets.
The 1933 Act is designed to regulate the initial distribution
of securities to the public while the 1934 Act is directed at public
trading after the initial distribution. Both Acts are primarily disclosure statutes. Neither Act regulates the quality of securities
sold and traded in the public domain. As long as disclosure requirements are met, the public is entitled to buy and, more im28
portantly, sellers are entitled to offer virtually worthless stock.
Thus, the importance of stringent application of disclosure rules
and strict compliance under the antifraud provisions is readily
apparent.
The origins of the antifraud provisions can be traced to the
New Deal response to the "financial debacle of the 1920's, inveslent, get-rich-quick schemes sprouted throughout the country. The legislative confusion and ensuing public panic was the catalyst for the stock
market crash of 1929. See generally LONG, supra note 22, at 542-43. For a
comprehensive legislative history of the Acts, see J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SEcuRrITES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a--77aa (1976).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a--78kk (1976).
26. Preamble to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a--77aa (1976).
The Senate Report on the bill, which ultimately became the 1933 Act, stated:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest
business. The basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts
concerning securities... and providing protection against fraud and
misrepresentation.
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public ....
to
place adequate and true information before the investor, to protect honest enterprise ... [and] to restore the confidence of the prospective
investor ....
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). See also H. R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); 77 CONG. REC. 2983 (1933) (statement of Sen.
Fletcher, sponsor of the bill).
27. Preamble to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976). Professor Loss has commented that the 1934 Act has four basic
purposes: "to afford a measure of disclosure to people who buy and sell
securities; to prevent and afford remedies for fraud in securities trading and
manipulation of the markets; to regulate the securities markets, and to control the amount of the Nation's credit which goes into those markets." Loss,
supra note 23, at 130-31.
28. See generally, J. S. HoFFmAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE SECUR!TIES LAws

(PL.I. No. 277, 1977).
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tigations of which revealed widespread fraud, manipulation and
victimization of public investors by concealment of relevant information. '29 Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act was enacted to prevent fraudulent interstate transactions. Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act was enacted to prevent false and misleading trading
practices. By passing these statutes, Congress was attempting
to quell the proliferation of deceptive investment schemes. Congress was equally concerned that investors have equal access to
material securities information.30 The antifraud provisions, and
the Acts as a whole, have been described as "remedial legislation."31 They are intended to deter fraudulent conduct and provide remedies for victims, in connection with the offer, sale or
purchase of securities.
29. See BROMBERG, 1 SECURmES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD

110 (1979).

§ 2.2, at

For the legislative evolution of § 17(a), see Aaron v. SEC, 444 U.S. 914
(1979); for the legislative evolution of § 10(b), see Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976); for the interesting origin of rule lOb-5,
see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 767 (1975) (Blackmun, J. dissenting), for the proposition that rule lOb-5 derived from section
17(a). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1979).
30. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 131 (1972).
The congressional purpose in enacting § 17(a) is best summarized in the
Senate Report:

The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest
business ....
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public
by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through
misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the
investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered
to the public through crooked promotion; to restore the confidence of
the prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; to bring
into productive channels of industry and development capital which
has grown timed to the point of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and restoring buying and consuming power.
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).

The congressional purpose for § 10(b) is found in a statement by one of
its draftsmen, Thomas Corcoran:
Subsection (c) 19(c) of H.R. 7952 - later § 10(b)] says, 'Thou shalt not
devise any other cunning devices.'
Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative

devices. I do not think there is any objection to that kind of clause. The
Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative
devices.
HEARINGS ON

H.R. 7852 AND H.R. 8720 BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON

73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934); see also
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (§ 10(b) as a catch-all clause).
31. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). The civil enforcement
mechanism of these provisions includes both express and implied remedies. For a list of express sanctions see Bromberg,supra note 11, at § 2.7; for
the origin of an implied remedy, see Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
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DefinitionalProblems and Judicial Interpretation
Since the enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, there have
been repeated demands upon the federal courts to define the
proper scope of the securities laws. 32 These demands, unfortunately, have led to incongruous results. It is not uncommon for
participants in an "original" investment-type scheme to be perplexed as to whether or not the plan is subject to the securities
laws. One commentator has cautioned that "[t]he definition of
the term 'security'. . . is for the33 most part one of the best kept
secrets in recent legal history."
Nevertheless, the favored judicial approach is to construe
the statutes liberally.34 The obvious basis of this approach is the
caveat prefacing the definitional sections of each Act: a definition will apply "unless the context otherwise requires.135 As a
result of this phrase, the courts must examine the "surrounding
factual circumstances" of the challenged transaction or instrument3 6

in order to determine the applicability of the securities

statutes. This essentially "substance over form" approach
broadens coverage of the Acts.
The United States Supreme Court specifically rejected a literal application of the securities acts in United HousingFoundation, Inc. v. Forman.3 7 Even before Forman, the courts had
32. See generally Hannan & Thomas, supra note 2, at 219-25; see also
Newton, A Look at the Montana Securities Acts and Its Relation to the Federal SecuritiesActs, 26 MONT. L. REV. 31 (1964); Comment, The Commercial
PaperMarket and the SecuritiesActs, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 362 (1972).
An example of a transaction which has been highly scrutinized as to its
applicability to the securities laws is the garden-variety commercial note.
See generally Lipton &Katz, "Notes" are not Always Securities, 30 Bus. L.
763 (1975); Comment, Notes as Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 MD. L. REV. 233 (1976); Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L.REv. 478 (1973).
33. Hannan &Thomas, supra note 2, at 219.
34. See generally, Pasquesi, The Expanding "Securities" Concept, 49
ILL. BJ. 728 (1961). There is some confusion on this point. On at least five
occasions the U.S. Supreme Court has rebuked the lower courts for reading
the term "security" too restrictively. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 2, at
219. Yet, on other occasions the same Court has held to a rigid and narrow
formula in defining securities transactions. Id. at 220.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b, 78c (1976). See also SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969).
36. Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's, Inc., 543 F.2d 38, 39 (7th Cir. 1976) (economic context of 5-year note given to purchase a business indicated that
note was not a "security," notwithstanding the fact that statute defining "security" includes "any note").
37. 421 U.S. 837, 850 (1975) (literal use of term "stock" for shares sold by
a cooperative not considered a securities transaction merely because statutory definition refers to "stock"); cf. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross &
Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1132 (2d Cir. 1976) (party asserting that note was not
within securities provision had burden of showing that "context otherwise
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adopted a nonliteral approach in defining securities. This early
approach, often applicable to investment contracts, arose out of
SEC v. Howey Co. 38 in 1946. That case fashioned a test known as
the Howey formula: an investment plan qualifies if profits are
expected to be derived from the efforts of others.3 9 This approach, although strictly followed by the courts for several decades, has recently been criticized as too rigid and ill-suited to
meet the exigencies of modem promotional schemes. 4°
A widely accepted nonliteral approach is the "economic realities" approach 4 which concentrates on motivation, control
and the risk of economic loss in a subject transaction. If a
scheme is such that venture capital is obtained from an "investor" and the risk of losing that capital shifts to the "investor,"
that "investor" is entitled to the protection of the securities
laws.42
requires" removes it from meaning of "securities"). The Forman court
noted that "[w1ith the exception of the Second Circuit, every court of Appeals recently to consider the issue has rejected the literal approach. .. ."
421 U.S. at 849 n.14. See also National Bank of Commerce v. All Amer. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1301 (5th Cir. 1978) (Supreme Court discounted
the so-called literal approach).
38. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
39. The text of Justice Murphy's definitional test reads:
[A] n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Acts means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in
a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares
in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.
Id. at 298-99.
40. See generally Coffey, The Realities of a "Security".- Is There a More
Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367 (1967); Hannan &
Thomas, supra note 2; Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts"
to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971).

41. One author has attempted to provide a framework for the "economic
realities" approach by providing seven questions:
(1) What is the participant asked to contribute to the enterprise?
(2) Is there a common enterprise?
(3) Is the participant led to expect a profit?
(4) How does the promotor characterize the promotion?
(5) Where does the risk of loss fall?
(6) Is the participant's contribution risk capital?
(7) Who is in control of the venture?
Hannan &Thomas, supra note 2, at 236-49.
For examples of application of the "economic realities" approach, see
United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975) (shares
purchased for housing not investment); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
aniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559-61 (1979) (participation in non-contributory, compulsory pension plan motivated by desire for livelihood not investment).
42. Risk analysis is critical to this approach. The analyst must distinguish between normal "commercial" risks, which are unprotected by securities laws, and "investment-type" risks, which are protected.
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A final nonliteral approach, similar but not interrelated to
the "economic realities" approach, is the "commercial/investment dichotomy. '43 This test considers the duality of
subject transactions and looks to their basic nature or context in
discerning whether it is investment-oriented or not. When an
"investor" contributes capital to an "investee" with the expectation that a return will be realized from the "investee's" employment of the capital, the transaction is deemed speculative, and
thus investment-oriented."
The Pledge Revisited

As mentioned previously, the pledge at common law is distinguishable from a sale since a pledge involves a transfer of
possession only and not of title.45 Under the securities acts,
however, and particularly under the antifraud provisions, a
Whenever some future performance is promised to the customer of an
enterprise, there is the commercial risk that the promisor will not perform or that intervening insolvency of the promisor will prevent or delay performance. These types of 'normal' commercial risks, without
more, do not shift the principal risk to the customer.
Hannan &Thomas, supra note 2, at 242-43.
Conversely, if an enterprise were to solicit the customer merely as a
"conduit" of the market place, the principal risk of loss would lie with the
customer-investor. Id.
43. This approach evolved out of a series of three cases primarily concerned with notes as securities: Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th
Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972). The Bellah court pioneered
the phrase "commercial/investment dichotomy." 495 F.2d at 1112 n.3. For a
discussion of this approach, see generally Comment, Bank Loan Participations as Securities: Notes, Investment Contracts, and the Commercial/Investment Dichotomy, 15 DUQ. L. REV.261 (1976-77). For examples of
application of this approach, see McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490,
493 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 903 (1975) (notes excluded from
coverage because underlying transaction not investment-oriented); National Bank of Commerce v. All Amer. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1301-02
(5th Cir. 1978) (notes excluded due to commercial nature).
44. Courts have had difficulty applying the commercial/investment dichotomy because even commercial transactions involve a degree of speculation. Consequently, some courts have developed a check list:
1. The amount of time between issuance and maturity;
2. whether the proceeds are to be used to purchase consumer goods or
services;
3. the risk of loss on the note, using the extent of collateralization and
the relationship between the amount borrowed and the size of the
borrower's business as indications of the degree of risk;
4. whether the notes were issued to a single party or to a large class of
investors;
5. how the instrument is characterized in the business community.
Great W. Bank &Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1976). See also
C.N.S. Enter., Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, 508 F.2d 1354, 1361 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
45. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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pledge is not so readily distinguishable. 46 The difficulty lies in
the liberal definitions of an "offer or sale" in the 1933 Act 47 and
"purchase or sale" in the 1934 Act. 48 On their face,

Is] tatutory definitions of 'sale' would appear broad enough to embrace a transfer of a security interest in stock since a 'sale' under
the 1933 Act includes 'every ... disposition of a[ n] ... interest ina

security for value.' The 'or otherwise dispose of' language of the
1934 Act definition [of
49 sale] could also be interpreted to extend to a
pledge transaction.
THE CONTROVERSY IN THE CIRcurrs

The expansion of the common law concept of "sale" under
the Acts placed a direct definitional problem before the courts:
whether a pledge of stock constituted a sale under the securities
acts. This problem was further complicated by the lack of uniformity in definitional approaches adopted by the courts.
In 1960, the Second Circuit, in SEC v. Guild Films Co. ,50 took
the initiative in holding that a pledge of stock was a "sale" under
the Acts. 51 The issue before the court was whether pledgee
banks fell within the definition of "underwriter" in section 2(11)
of the 1933 Act. 52 In order to decide, the court held that a pledge
of stock was a sale within the meaning of section 2(3) of the 1933
Act. 53 In this manner, the court refused an alleged exempted
status of pledgee banks and found them liable under section 5 of
the 1933 Act- for distributing unregistered securities in a foreclosure sale.5 5

46. See, e.g., infra note 63 and accompanying text.
47. The terms "offer" and "sale" are defined in section 2(3) of the 1933
Act:
The term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract of sale or disposition
of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term . .. 'offer'

shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an
offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976) (emphasis added).
48. The term "sale" is defined in § 3(a) (14) of the 1934 Act as "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14) (1976) (emphasis added); the term "purchase" is defined in § 3(a) (13) of the 1934 Act as
"any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(13) (1976) (emphasis added).
49. Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1038, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1979).
50. 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819.
51. Prior to 1960, the proposition that a pledge was not a "sale" under
the securities acts was generally upheld. See Loss, supra note 23, at 517.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1976). This section defines an "underwriter"
(expressly not exempt from registration) as "any person who has
purchased." Id. (emphasis added).

53. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
55. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 490 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied
sub nom. Santa Monica Bank v. SEC, 364 U.S. 819. The Guild case is prima-
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The significance of the Second Circuit opinion lies in the
court's holding on the scope of "purchase" as applied under section 2(11). The court pointed out that the term, although not defined in the 1933 Act, should be interpreted in a manner
complementary to the definition of "sale," which is defined in
section 2(3). Under that definition, pledgee banks qualify as
"purchasers" vis-a-vis their acceptance of a collateral interest in
pledged stock.5 6 The disadvantage in using Guild as precedent
under the antifraud provisions is that Guild involved an action
for registration violations and not an action for fraud.5 7 Nevertheless, Guild spurred a series of conflicting court of appeals decisions during the next two decades.5 8
The Seventh Circuit in SEC v. Dolnick,5 9 held that a pledge
of unregistered securities constituted a "sale" for purposes of
registration provisions of the 1933 Act. Furthermore, misrepresentations as to the marketability of pledge stock provided a basis for a section 10(b) cause of action. The court reasoned that
since the pledgor had disposed of an interest in a security, the
transaction qualified under section 2(3) as a "sale. '60 The
Dolnick decision, however, is a weak antifraud precedent since
the court, as in Guild, was concerned with a registration violation under section 5 of the 1933 Act.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in McClure v. First National
Bank of Lubbock, 61 held that a pledge of stock in a privately nerily concerned with the protection of investors by requiring that a registration statement be filed with the SEC. The plaintiff in the case sought a
preliminary injunction to restrain delivery of unregistered securities already sold by the pledgee bank. The Second Circuit upheld the granting of
an injunction. Id.
In support of its rejection of the pledgee bank's "bona fide pledgee" defense, the Second Circuit relied on Congress's rejection of an express exemption for foreclosures pursuant to a "good faith" failure to register. Id. at
489. See generally Comment, The Guild Films Case, The Effect of "Good
Faith" in Foreclosure Sales of Unregistered Securities Pledged as Collat-

eral, 46 VA. L. REv. 1573, 1584 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Good Faith].
56. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied
sub nom. Santa Monica Bank v. SEC, 364 U.S. 819.
57. For further criticism of the Guild precedent, see Comment, Securities Law-Rule 10b-5 Standing-Pledgeof Securities in a Loan Transaction
Held to Constitute a Sale-Mallis v. FDIC, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 660-61

(1977).
58. See Loss, supra note 23, at 649; Pierce, Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Guild Films Co., 16 Bus. LAW. 603 (1961); Good Faith, supra
note 55, at 1584.
59. 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974). In Dolnick, a broker had engaged in
pledging unregistered securities for a bank loan and then attempting to sell
the securities in repayment of the loan.
60. Id. at 1283.
61. 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975). In McClure, a note and trust deed were given as collateral in a corporate loan.
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gotiated renewal of a bank loan did not constitute a "sale" of a
security for purposes of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The court
stressed that "mere acceptance of a stock pledge as collateral in
a privately negotiated transaction. . . does not, of itself, bring it
within the scope of the federal securities acts. '62 McClure dist-

inguished Guild on the grounds that it arose under section 5 of
the 1933 Act and involved a sale following default. The Fifth Circuit indicated its reluctance to extend antifraud protection absent a foreclosure on the pledged stock-an argument which
unfortunately follows the common law notion of "sale" and the
importance of title.
In United States v. Gentile,63 the Second Circuit held that a
pledge of securities was a "sale" for purposes of a criminal proceeding under section 17(a). The court rejected McClure's requirement that title pass in order to find a "sale"; such a
requirement would be unreasonably dependent upon subsequent events (foreclosure or subsequent sale). 64 As support for
its holding, the Gentile court noted that "the pledgee assumes a
very real investment risk that the pledged securities will have
continuing value, a risk that is identical in nature to the risk
taken by investors which serves as an indisputable basis for
statutory regulation of securities transactions. '65 Gentile is the
first persuasive court of appeals opinion advocating antifraud
protection for pledges of stock. Its shortcoming, however, is its
confinement to a section 17(a) action under the 1933 Act; it does
not extend its holding to a section 10(b) action under the 1934
Act.
Next, in Mallis v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,66 the
Second Circuit granted standing under section 10(b) on the
grounds that a "sale" had transpired when the plaintiff banks
Subsequently, a pledge of stock in the corporation was also given in support

of a loan extension.
62. Id. at 495.
63. 530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976). Gentile involved a criminal prosecution for a fraudulent pledge of unauthorized
securities.
64. Id. at 467 n.6.
65. Id. at 467.
66. 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. grantedsub mon. Bankers Trust Co.
v. Mallis, 431 U.S. 928, cert. dismissed as improvidently granted sub nom.,
Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978), reh'g denied, 436 U.S. 915
(1979). The unusual facts giving rise to the fraud in Mallis were as follows:
two dentists loaned money to an attorney to finance the purchase of securities from a third party. The attorney delivered the securities to the dentists
as collateral for the loan. When the attorney defaulted on the loan, the dentists learned that the stock was worthless and brought this action under
§ 10(b) and rule lob-5. The Second Circuit held that plaintiffs were "purchasers" when they accepted the collateral and that Bankers Trust, which
had originally released the securities to the dentists, was a "seller."
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accepted pledged securities as collateral. The court strongly rejected the McClure requirement of foreclosure and reiterated its
rationale, previously stated in Gentile, that full title was not determinative in finding a "sale. '67 The court unhesitatingly applied its section 17(a) holding in Gentile to a section 10(b) cause
of action.6 8 Thus, Mallis represents the strongest court of appeals decision in favor of extending protection to pledges under
both Acts.
The Fifth Circuit concluded in National Bank of Commerce
v. All American Assurance Co. ,69that a commercial loan secured
by a pledge of worthless stock does not satisfy the commercial/investment test and, therefore, could not be protected by
either section 17(a) or section 10(b). The court acknowledged
that as a matter of policy, the securities acts could embrace a
pledge but withheld their application due to the pure commercial aspects of the transaction. All American concentrated on
the contrast between the rights and risks of a pledgee as compared with a seller. The holding is somewhat weak since it applies what is basically an "economic realities" approach in
70
support of a commercial/investment argument.
The Sixth Circuit, in Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball and
Turben,7 1 held that a pledge of stock to a broker-dealer was a
"purchase" or "sale" under section 10(b) and applied it to rule
lOb-5. The court found the Second Circuit holdings in Mallis
and Gentile more persuasive than the Fifth Circuit holdings in
All American and McClure. After summarily adopting the Second Circuit position, the Mansbach court attempted to reconcile
its holding with the Fifth Circuit cases by applying the commercial/investment test to the broker-dealer relationship. 72 It is unclear whether this test or Second Circuit authority was
67. Id. at 830.
68. Id. at 828-29.
69. 583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978). In this case, a new issuance of stock,
which was not approved by the Board of Directors, was worthless. Plaintiff
bank accepted the unauthorized stock as pledge collateral and when the
issuing company went bankrupt, sought relief under § 10(b) and § 17(a).
The court applied the commercial/investment test in concluding that the
loan was essentially commercial and, therefore, unprotected under the securities laws. Id. at 1301.
70. Id. at 1300. Since the court relies on the rights and risks of the parties, the more appropriate test would be the "economic realities" of the subject transaction. See supra notes 41 & 42.
71. 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979). In this case, plaintiff pledged corporate
bonds to a brokerage firm as collateral for option trading. When a dispute
arose over plaintiffs account, the pledgee firm refused to release a few of
the bonds and this action ensued under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
72. Id. at 1029. See supra note 11.
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controlling in the Mansbach holding; yet the value of Mansbach
as a precedent is only slightly weakened as a result.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit, in Lincoln National Bank v.
Herber,73 denied antifraud protection under either Act to a bank
which had accepted stock as collateral in a commercial loan
transaction. Absent default and foreclosure, a pledge of stock in
an ordinar commercial context was not the sort of transaction
that would affect the securities market. 74 Herber advanced the
Fifth Circuit position in the same fashion that Mansbach
strengthened the Second Circuit position. Following Herber,
the division in the circuit courts was clear; the Second and Sixth
Circuits relied on investment risk and "disposition of an interest" arguments 75 while the Fifth and Seventh Circuits relied
on the title/foreclosure and commercial/investment
76
rationales.
THE RUBIN DECISION
The United States Supreme Court partially resolved the
77
controversy among the circuits in Rubin v. United States.
Rubin affirmatively established that a pledge of stock is construed as an "offer" or "sale" of a security within the meaning of
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 78 Whether a pledge of stock would

equally apply to section 10(b) of the 1934 Act was not specifically
before the Court, and thus was not addressed.
Defendant Rubin, an officer and agent for a financially
troubled company, approached Bankers Trust Company (Bankers) to secure a "bail-out" loan. Bankers refused Rubin's $5 million loan request and instead loaned him $50,000. Bankers
stipulated that additional financing would be available if adequate collateral and financial data were presented. 79 Thereafter,
Rubin reapproached Bankers with false and misleading
financial statements and a pledge of worthless stock as collateral. 80 Rubin continued to deceive the bank on the continuing
73. 604 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1979). The case involved an attorney who, acting as trustee of a trust with "assets" consisting of counterfeit securities,
obtained a loan by pledging the counterfeit securities to a third party bank.
Plaintiff bank then participated in the loan to the attorney and brought this
action under § 17(a) and § 10(b) when the fraud was discovered upon
default.
74. Id. at 1044.
75. See supra notes 63, 64 &66 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 61, 68 & 72 and accompanying text.
77. 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
78. Id. at 428-31.
79. Id. at 425.
80. Id. at 425-26.
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value of the securities by manipulating stock quotations. 81
Based upon these misrepresentations, Bankers loaned Rubin
$475,000. When Bankers finally became suspicious and called in
the loan, Rubin's company was unable to pay. 82 Bankers
against Rubin and the company for collection on
brought suit
83
the notes.
Rubin was convicted, inter alia, of violation of section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit afby the Supreme Court
firmed, and limited certiorari was granted
84
to review the section 17(a) conviction.
The Supreme Court rejected Rubin's argument that the
pledgee's implied power to dispose of the stock could not ripen
into full title until foreclosure. The Court stated: "[A]lthough
pledges transfer less than absolute title, the interest thus transferred nonetheless is an 'interest in a security'" within the
85
meaning of section 2(3) of the 1933 Act.

The Rubin Court next reviewed the legislative history of the
term "sale." The definition of "sale" in the 1933 Act was adopted
practically verbatim from a model "blue sky" statute. 86 That
model act's definition of a sale was held to include pledges in a
1932 circuit court decision. 87 Subsequent enactment of the 1933
Act, without excepting pledges, indicated congressional intent
to give the definition of "sale" the broad coverage afforded under
prior case law.88
Finally, the Rubin Court applied an "economic realities" approach and held that the risk assumed by a lender when it accepts pledged stock as collateral is similar to the risk that an
investor undertakes in purchasing stock. Each transferee relies
on the continuing value of the securities and each depends on
the transferor's representations. Furthermore, protecting misled stock pledgees comports with the legislative purpose of the
89
1933 Act.

ANALYSIS

The Rubin Court clearly adopted the Second and Sixth Circuits' positions articulated in Gentile and Mallis, respectively.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 427.
Id.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 430 n.7.

87. Cecil B. DeMille Prod., Inc. v. Wollery, 61 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1932).
88. Rubin, 449 U.S. at 430.
89. Id. at 431.
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Rubin rejected by implication the Fifth and Seventh Circuits'
positions represented by All American and McClure. This rejection, however, presumes that the two sets of circuit court positions are mutually exclusive.
The Rubin holding rejects the argument that title must pass
in all cases of a "sale" under the antifraud provision. The Court
appropriately recognizes a fundamental distinction between
common law and statutory concepts of "sale." The remedial
purposes of the securities acts mandate a general departure
from the common law requirement that title pass in order to recognize a "sale."
Assuming, arguendo, that the title requirement could not be
obviated, the statutory definition of "sale" contained in section
2(3) of the 1933 Act,90 nevertheless, recognizes a pledge. The
phrases "every... disposition of' and "interest in a security,"
given their commonly understood meaning, make unmistakeable an intent to include pledges since, as mentioned, a pledgor
disposes of an inchoate property interest.91 The Supreme Court
has stressed, on several occasions, that the operative language
of the securities statutes should be given its "commonly ac'9 2
cepted meaning.
The Rubin Court examined the pledge of stock transaction
from the lender's standpoint and concluded that the "economic
considerations and realities" are much akin to the "normal" investor. The pledgee's risk and dependency on representations
are investment-oriented and, thus, require the protection of the
is a sound
securities laws. 93 This argument, identical to Gentile,
94
application of the "economic realities" approach.
Rubin does not address, however, the obvious commercial
nature of the pledge of stock involved in the case. The Court
ignores the commercial/investment dichotomy, perhaps because applying such a test might diminish the value of Rubin as
a precedent. Regardless, an essential concern at the root of the
commercial/investment dichotomy deserves discussion. That
90. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976).
91. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Whether the basis for including pledges is "disposition" or "interest" is simply a matter of choice.
Each argument is equally sound. Compare the majority opinion of Chief
Justice Burger, 449 U.S. at 424-31 with the concurring opinion of Justice
Blackmun at 431-32. Burger emphasizes that antifraud protection should be
afforded to recipients of full title and "defeasible interests" in a security.
Blackmun maintains that a pledge is a "disposition" per se.
92. Ernst &Ernst v. Hockfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
93. Rubin, 449 U.S. at 427.
94. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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concern arises out of Blue-Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores95
which held that section 10(b) standing is limited to actual purchasers and sellers. If pledgees of stock in pure commercial
loan situations have standing to sue, the classes of potential
plaintiffs may exceed the proper scope of the Acts pursuant to
Blue-Chip. This argument has little merit since the claimed limitation to actual purchasers and sellers--contemplating full passage of title-is a requirement, as has been shown, which is not
statutorily imposed in either the 1933 or 1934 Acts. 96 The transfer of "an interest," e.g., a lender's security interest, is all that is
imposed.
Parallelismbetween Section 17(a) and Section 10(b)
A significant but unresolved issue flowing from the Rubin
decision is whether a pledge of stock constitutes a "sale" for
purposes of the antifraud provisions in both the 1933 and 1934
Acts. The courts are divided on the question of using precedents under one securities act as authority for a holding under
the other. The prevailing viewpoint, upheld by the United
States Supreme Court, is that the 1933 and 1934 Acts should be
a
interpreted as "one body of law."'97 The Supreme Court in 98
landmark securities decision, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
pointed out that the two Acts are "interrelated components" of a
single federal regulatory scheme. 99 This statement has
prompted the lower courts to apply certain precedents under
the 1933 and 1934 Acts interchangeably.
The minority viewpoint is to treat precedents under the 1933
and 1934 Acts separately. This treatment received limited approval in SEC v. National Securities, Inc. 10 0 In that case, the
Court cautioned that "the same words may take on different coloration in different sections of the securities laws."' 10 1 Thus, a
segregated definitional application was recommended. Undue
95. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Blue-Chip adopted a rule set forth in Birnbaum
v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956,
which banned suits by potential buyers and sellers of securities.
96. See supra note 47.
97. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1968). The Tcherepnin
Court, in holding that withdrawable capital shares were securities under
the 1934 Act, indicated that "[t] he same Congress which passed the Securities Act of 1933 approved the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the definition of security contained in the 1934 Act is virtually identical to that in
the earlier enactment." Id. at 342. See also Hannan &Thomas, supra note 2,
at 220-23 nn.6-19. For a discussion of the major differences in the Acts, see
BROMBERG, supra note 11, at § 4.6.
98. 425 U.S. 185 (1975).
99. Id. at 206.
100. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
101. Id. at 466.
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reliance on technical distinctions between the Acts, however,
creates a bottleneck in securities laws enforcement. Bifurcated
definitions are more difficult to apply than unified ones. That is
undoubtedly one of the reasons why the minority view has not
been widely accepted.
There is convincing authority that, despite slight differences
between the Acts, the definitions of "purchase" and "sale" are
"functionally equivalent. 1 0 2 It is certainly apparent that "sale"
as used in section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the
1934 Act are in pari materia. It is also clear that "purchase"
should complement "sale.' u0 3 Therefore, it follows that these
terms, as used under each Act, should be construed together.
The Mallis court specifically upheld this rationale:
We believe that the rationale underlying our holding in Gentile
with respect to sections 2(3) and 17(a) of the 1933 Act is persuasive
authority for the holding that a pledge constitutes a 'contract to sell
or otherwise dispose of' a security within the meaning of section
3(14) of the 1934 Act. Accordingly, on the facts of this case, we hold
that both a 'sale' and a1 °4'purchase' may be cognizable under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act.
The inescapable conclusion is that section 17(a) holdings should
apply with equal force to section 10(b) causes of action. Hence,
Rubin should be construed as mandating that pledges of stock
receive antifraud protection under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Other Policy Considerations
As mentioned before, the securities acts, and specifically the

05
antifraud provisions, are considered "remedial" legislation.
This does not require that only investors benefit from the legislation. The securities laws should not be limited to preserving
the integrity of the securities market alone. Wherever possible,
the administration of these statutes should also promote "high
standards of business ethics."'1 6 Rubin achieves the result of
promoting fair-play in lending transactions in which stock is
pledged.
With reference to lending institutions, the prevention of
stock price manipulation which impinges on the "fair valuation

102. See National Bank of Commerce v. All Amer. Assurance Co., 583
F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1978); see also McClure v. First Nat'l. Bank, 497 F.2d
490, 493 n.1, (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 903 (1975).
103. SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) cert. denied,
364 U.S. 819.
104. Mallis v. Federal Dep. Insur. Co., 568 F.2d 824, 830 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 431 U.S. 928, cert. dismissed as
improvidently grantedsub nom. Banker's Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381.
105. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
106. Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975).
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of collateral for bank loans" is an articulated, but often neglected, purpose of the 1934 Act.' 0 7 In FranklinNationalBank v.
Meadows, 0 8 the court granted an implied right of action, in part,
because of its specific concern with the manipulation of prices
for securities pledged as collateral. The premise underlying this
effect-oriented policy concern is that banks will be unduly
placed in insecure positions as creditors as a sole result of borrowers' deceptive practices. This unwarranted result, as well as
the general policy consideration described above, provides additional support to extending antifraud protection to pledges of
stock under the 1934 Act.
CONCLUSION

The enumerated purpose of federal securities legislation is
to promote full disclosure and provide remedies against persons
who engage in fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.10 9 In order to achieve this objective, the courts have
liberally construed the provisions contained in the Acts. A flexible reading of the definition of "sale" within the meaning of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act enabled the Rubin Court to extend
antifraud protection to pledges of stock where it previously had
been applied sporadically in the federal circuits. Although
Rubin can be criticized as overstepping the intended coverage
of the Acts, this criticism is quickly overcome when the investment risks and realities of pledgees, coupled with the overriding
purposes of the Acts, are considered.
Thus, as a strong precedent, Rubin's section 17(a) holding
lays the groundwork for application to its sister provision, section 10(b). A parallel reading of sections 17(a) and 10(b) with
respect to pledges of stock resolves the controversy in the circuits. Furthermore, and most importantly, it is a step toward
minimizing misunderstanding and inconsistency in the enforcement of federal securities laws.
Michael T Raymond

107. Section 2(3) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (1976).
108. 318 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
109. See supra notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text.

